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I. INTRODUCTION

Few of us, when returning from our local music retailer or clicking
"checkout" at our favorite Internet downloading service, pause to consider
the small miracles of standardization required to make our listening
experience possible. CDs are all the same diameter so that we need only
purchase one type of CD player. A similar phenomenon exists for
electronic music downloads.' Earphone jack inputs are all the same size,
allowing us to purchase earphones from any number of manufacturers to
be used on any number of audio devices,2 as were the microphone inputs
on the recording equipment used to capture the music in the first place. 3
From the Internet protocols enabling online browsing and downloading,4
to the gasoline in the truck that brought the CDs to market,5 to the
smorgasbord of electronic devices plugged into uniform three-prong
electrical outlets, standardization was ubiquitous. From low-tech to high,
our's is an economy teeming with standards. Standards enable and drive
the innovation in which we take immense pride and through which we
enjoy a tremendous standard of living.
But there is a darker side. Some standards become so through
competition. Rival firms develop rival standards, consumers try them out,
and the best standard wins.6 Other standards, however, are born through

1. See, e.g., Best Buy, http://www.bestbuy.com (search for "mp3 players") (last visited Apr.
6, 2007) (offering many different mp3 players, all of which play mp3 music files).
2. Searching bestbuy.com reveals a variety of styles of headphones, all of which terminate
in either a 1/4" or 1/8" diameter plug, and many of which also offer a converter to change between
the two options. See, e.g., Best Buy, supranote I (search for "headphones") (last visited Mar. 15,
2007).
3. A search on www.asmash.com for "mixers" shows that all varieties use "XLR" and/or
1/4" diameter inputs. See, e.g., Sam Ash, Mixers, at http://www.samash.com/catalog/groups.asp?
GroupCode=sm mixers (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
4. See How Does the Internet Work?, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Engineering/CIS/Sloan/
web/es 130/internet/intwork.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
5. Notice the next time you fill up your tank that gasoline is available in certain octane
increments.
6. Try finding a Betamax player or Betamax cassettes these days. VHS beat out Betamax
in a head-to-head competition in the 1980s. See, e.g., Seth A. Cohen, To Innovate or Not to
Innovate, That is The Question: The Functions, Failures,and Foibles ofthe Reward Function
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agreement. Rival firms decide among themselves what the standard will
be.' One need not have a legally trained nose to detect the back-room
smoke of cartelization.
This is the tension. On the one hand, standards, even those set by
competitor agreement, allow new markets to flourish and resources to be
used optimally toward efficient innovation. Consumers probably do not
care what size holes are used in their electrical outlets, so long as they do
not need to install three electrical systems in their homes. But sometimes
the standard itself really does matter. Some electronic formats may be
faster and better than others, but might yield a lower profit margin for
producers, and so are less likely to be selected by competitors agreeing on
a standard even though consumers might prefer them. The trick, then, is
to develop a system that allows competitors to eliminate "wasteful"
competition where the standard itself is unimportant in relation to the
standardization, but prohibits competitors from using standards to keep
from competing away profits where consumers would benefit from the
battle of standards.
Much of modem antitrust thought, generally and with respect to
standards, focuses on economic efficiency.' Less often is the effect of an
antitrust rule on the ability of consumers to control the future of an
industry considered. Consensus standards-those set by competitors by
agreement-are a logical place to apply a consumer-focused antitrust
model, since consensus standards, if reached without consideration of
consumer preferences, make the consumer irrelevant.
In 2004, Congress passed the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act (SDOAA). 9 The SDOAA, in short, permits standardsetting organizations to register their activities with the Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice in exchange for a "detrebling" of
damages in any private suit arising out of the disclosed activities.'" The
SDOAA's protections have been widely utilized by organizations that
have registered under its provisions, but the SDOAA has been virtually
ignored in antitrust scholarship, despite its potential for illuminating the
debate on how antitrust should regulate standards in the high-tech era.

Theory of PatentLaw in Relation to Computer Software Platforms, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.

L. REv. 1, 15 (1998-99).
7. See, e.g., ANSI, Standards Activities Overview, http://ansi.org/standards-activities/
overview/overview.aspx?menuid=3 (last visited May 21, 2007).
8. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOx (1978).

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (2004).
10. Id.
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This Article examines the SDOAA in detail, and asserts that Congress
intended that standard-setting organizations seeking the SDOAA's
protection must include consumer representation in the standard-setting
process. This should be understood as a victory for consumer-based
antitrust theory, and should be taken seriously by courts and enforcement
agencies going forward.
Part II provides a general background on standards and their antitrust
treatment. Part il takes a close look at the SDOAA's provisions. Part IV
discusses the consumer choice theory of antitrust commonly attributed to
Professor Robert Lande and draws some conclusions about how the theory
should be applied to collaborative standard setting. Part V examines the
SDOAA's legislative history and determines that Congress wanted the
SDOAA's protections to apply only to those organizations that include
consumer representation. Finally, Part VI interprets the SDOAA's
provisions in light of Congress's consumer choice concern, and offers
practical suggestions for courts and enforcement agencies.
It is emphatically not the position of this Article that standards are bad
or that all standard-setting organizations are cartels. Nor is the Article's
position that economic efficiency is an unimportant or silly goal for
antitrust. Rather, this Article applauds Congress's consideration of
consumers in the standard-setting process in the belief that consumers are
a necessary ingredient for the development of optimal standards.
II. BACKGROUND

ON STANDARDS

A. Definitions and Various Types of Standards
Standards have been defined in many ways. One definition is "any set
of technical specifications that either provides or is intended to provide a
common design for a product or process."'" Another definition covers
anything "taken for a basis of comparison, or... accepted for current use
through authority, custom or general consent."'" Examples of standards
range from programming interfaces for Microsoft Windows that allow
other software to interface with the operating system 3 to electrical plugs

11. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual PropertyRights and Standard-SettingOrganizations,90
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002).
12. DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 8 (1975).
13. See Lemley, supranote 11, at 1896.
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and outlets that allow use of all electrical products anywhere in the United
States. '"
A helpful way of thinking of standards is to divide them into
"uniformity" or "quality" standards. 5 Uniformity standards include variety
simplification standards, which reduce the variety of offered products, and
interchangeability standards, which ensure that products may be
substituted for or work in conjunction with each other. 6 Quality standards
include terminology standards, which create uniform terminology in
describing and defining products; measurement standards, which create a
benchmark for measuring the characteristics of products; testing standards,
which make uniform the process for testing a product; and minimum
quality standards, which require products to meet some threshold of
quality. 7 Certification is the process of determining whether a given
product satisfies a given standard.'8
B. InterchangeabilityStandards
Interchangeability standards are linked to the concept of network
effects. Simply put, network effects occur when the value of a product
increases as more people use the same or interrelated products. 9 The
often-mentioned example is a telephone system; as more consumers use
a particular telephone system, each user has more people to call.2"
As a network grows, so do incentives for manufacturers to enter the
market for complementary products-telephones in the telephone network
example-thus increasing competition, innovation, and consumer options
in the complementary product market.2 In this regard, standards can have
benefits in a network environment independent of the positives or
negatives of the particular standard itself.22 That is, even if a particular
telephone system is inferior to some other system, consumers will still
have more people to call and more telephones from which to choose.
14. See id.
15. Harry S. Gerla, FederalAntitrustLawand TradeandProfessionalAssociationStandards
and Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 471, 473 (1994).
16. Id. at473.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Lemley, supra note 11, at 1896.
20. See id. Interchangeability standards span a range of technological sophistication, from
railroad track gauge to color TV transmission standards. See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao,
Standard-SettingConsortia,Antitrust, and High-TechnologyIndustries,64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247,
247 (1995).
21. See id. at 1896-97; see also Gerla, supra note 15, at 487.
22. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1897.
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Network effects may also reduce supply-side costs.23 Both the standardized
products themselves and inputs for the standardized products can be made
using longer production runs and thus capture economies of scale.24
Interchangeability standards are not without their anti-competitive
risks. When competitors agree on an interchangeability standard,
consumers lose the ability to select products based on their unique
characteristics. 25 Further, price-fixing and oligopoly can be facilitated
because it is easier for competitors to monitor standardized products for
compliance with the cartel agreement.26
Interchangeability standards can also inhibit innovation. 27 This happens
in several ways. Once a standard is set and network effects have been
achieved, consumers are less likely to jump ship to a new standard, even
if it is superior to the existing standard.28 The QWERTY typewriter has
been the dominant keyboard configuration since the 1880s because a
critical mass of typists learned the system early on. 29 This allowed
QWERTY to survive a challenge in the 1930s by the more efficient
Dvorak typewriter because employers would be required to retrain all of
their typists. 3° Thus, firms often have less incentive, or perhaps even a
disincentive, to engage in groundbreaking innovation that would displace
an existing standard altogether. That said, firms have in some
circumstances managed to displace entrenched standards. For example,
superior bottle screw-tops successfully displaced existing standardized
bottle caps, largely because the benefits were great and the cost of
conversion was not.31
Interchangeability standards also affect the types of innovation that will
occur in the standardized product industry. Pre-standardization, innovation
tends to be focused on creating or improving products.32 Once a product
is standardized, however, firms developing new products that do not

23. See id. at 249.
24. See id.
25. See Gerla, supranote 15, at 488.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See Melonie L. McKenzie, Note, How Should CompetingSoftware ProgramsMarry? The
Antitrust Ramifications of Private Standard-Setting Consortia in the Software Industry, 52
SYRACUSE L. REv. 139, 155 (2002).
29. Sean P. Gates, Standards,Innovation, andAntitrust: IntegratingInnovation Concerns
Into the Analysis of CollaborativeStandard-Setting,47 EMORY L.J. 583, 595 (1998).
30. See id. at 596.
31. See Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set StandardsorDefine Interfaces,61
ANTITRUST L.J. 921, 924 (1993).
32. See Gates, supranote 29, at 602.

THE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION AD VANCEMENTACT OF 2004

comply with the standard face enormous switching-cost barriers, and firms
thus focus innovation on improving the process by which the product is
made.33 Where product innovation continues, it tends to be incremental
rather than radical, or it is directed at the complementary products market
that interchangeability enables.34
These potential effects on innovation demonstrate a key temporal
component. While it is clear that a bad standard will have a negative
economic impact by entrenching an inferior standard, a standard that is set
too early in the life cycle of a particular product can also be detrimental
because it will deter future product innovation and prevent superior
products from ever developing.35
C. Quality andSafety Standards
Examples of quality and safety standards include the term "low fat,"
which is determined by a government standard 36 and "Snell approved"
motorcycle helmets, which are governed by private standard setting.37
These standards are often justified on health and safety grounds unrelated
to competition and provide important information to consumers.38 Some
quality and safety standards are routinely adopted by governmental
bodies.3 9 Private standard setting and compliance testing relieves local
governments of the burden of engaging in the activities themselves.4 ° New
market entry can also be facilitated, as manufacturers can be confident
that, if they meet the standard, customers will exist for their product.4 As
the Supreme Court noted in IndianHead,"[w]hen ...private associations

33. See id.
34. See id.at 603-04.
35. See id.at 608.
36. See id.at 597.
37. See Gates, supra note 29. See also Snell Memorial Foundation, Snell Helmet Testing
Programs (explaining Snell's various performance tests for its helmets), http://www.smf.org/
testing.html (last visited May 21, 2007).
38. Gerlasupranote 15, at489, 491.
39. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988)
(National Fire Protection Association's National Electrical Code); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559 (1982) (various mechanical codes).
40. See Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th Cir. 1980)
("Many states do not have adequate facilities to properly test whether or not a product complies
with... health and safety standards.").
41. See Gerla, supra note 15, at 492-93; Eliason Corp., 614 F.2d at 129 ("Uniformity
[resulting from a standard] helps promote nationwide competition and enables manufacturers who
elect to comply with NSF standards to be reasonably sure that they will not have to modify their
product in order to meet the different requirements of many jurisdictions.").
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promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert
judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting
process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling
product competition[,] . . . those private standards can have significant
pro[-]competitive advantages. 42
Quality and safety standards can also reduce consumer choice in a
manner that can be particularly troublesome. Consumers often make
purchasing decisions on the basis of both quality (whether that means
accuracy of result, durability, or some other measure) and price.43 If
competitors agree not to manufacture products that fall below some quality
threshold, consumers are denied the option of trading off quality for price
in a manner than might better suit their needs.' If the standard merely
provides information to consumers, however, without an agreement not to
produce products that do not comply with the standard, anti-competitive
potential largely falls away.45
Quality and safety standards come in two varieties: specification and
performance. Specification standards identify certain technical aspects that
a product must satisfy.' For example, a standard may require that piping
be a certain thickness.47 Where a specification standard is used, firms that
produce products compliant with the standard have an incentive and
greater opportunity to reduce competition by excluding potentially
competing products that perform the same function in a new manner that
does not satisfy the specification.48
Performance standards do not require products to meet a certain
technical specification. Rather, they require that a product demonstrate a
set level of quality through its performance, regardless of the product's
technical specifications.49 Continuing the piping example, a performance
standard would require that the piping withstand a certain amount of

42. Indian Head,486 U.S. at 501.
43. See Gerla, supra note 15, at 490-93.
44. See id. at 489-90.
45. See id. at 491.
46. See Gates, supra note 29, at 651.
47. See id.
48. See Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559, 561 (1982)
("Obviously, if a manufacturer's product cannot satisfy the applicable ASME code, it is at a great
disadvantage in the marketplace"; manufacturer "successfully used its position within ASME in an
effort to thwart Hydrolevel's competitive challenge"); see generally Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.
v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (effort by steel conduit manufacturers to exclude
polyvinyl chloride conduit from inclusion in the National Electrical Code).
49. See Gates, supra note 29, at 650.
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pressure or heat to be certified." Performance standards encourage
innovation by providing incentives for firms to provide the same quality
in new ways with less fear that their products will not be certified." This
innovation encouragement is not free, however. It is generally more
expensive to determine whether a product satisfies a level of performance
than a particular specification. 2
D. Uniformity and Other Standards
Variety simplification, or uniformity, standards, such as uniform
package size, can assist consumers in comparison shopping and in
understanding products, and thus increase competition. 3 Industry-wide
economies of scale can also be achieved through variety reduction. 4 Some
economies result from each firm's internal standardization, such as where
Company A produces only blue chairs, achieving an economy of scale in
the painting portion of production. These economies would occur
regardless of industry-wide standardization. As more firms agree to a
uniformity standard, however, upstream economies of scale are also
achieved, for example, in production of blue paint.
Uniformity standards also reduce or even eliminate consumer choice
and can lead to a loss of particular product features, product feature
competition, and a motivation to innovate.55 In the extreme, uniformity
standards, like interchangeability standards, have been used historically to
facilitate price-fixing. 6
Terminology, measurement, and testing standards provide consumers
with additional product information, and so long as the information is not
misleading, are generally pro-competitive. 7 These informational standards

50. See id.
51. See id.; see also Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 560 (time-delayed boiler cut-off arguably
superior to currently-used instant cut-off); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the
President, OMB Circ. No. A- 119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities (1998) [hereinafter A- 119] ("In
using voluntary consensus standards, your agency should give preference to performance
standards.").
52. See Gates, supra note 29, at 653.
53. See Gerla, supranote 15, at 484.
54. Id. at 484-85.
55. See id. at 485-86.
56. Id. at 486.
57. See id. at 488; see also Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 487
(1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.).
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allow consumers to compare products more readily, and thus facilitate
price competition.58 Further, where these standards lack the force of law,
consumers remain free to purchase non-certified products, and
manufacturers of those products are left with avenues to promote those
products.5 9
E. Certification
Accurate certification decisions related to antitrust-compliant standards
are generally considered pro-competitive.6" Erroneous certification
decisions, however, deprive consumers of the pro-competitive benefits of
the standard and may lead to erroneous purchasing decisions, and
obviously harm the firms that suffer an erroneous refusal to certify.6
These harms are exacerbated when the standard has been adopted by a
government agency as law because the victim firm cannot even attempt to
persuade consumers that its product is nonetheless safe and effective.
Because liability for erroneous certifications made in good faith may deter
beneficial certification activity, however, certification decisions made as
a result of reasonable procedures that are actually followed should be
protected.62
F. The Standard-SettingProcess
While the SDOAA addresses only standards reached by voluntary
consensus among competitors, standards are set in other ways as well. "De
facto" standards arise and are maintained purely through the operation of
the market.63 Microsoft Windows is one ready example. The computer
industry never collectively decided to interoperate with Windows over
The standard, in specifying what counts as a CISPI coupling, provides a relatively
cheap and effective way for a manufacturer or a buyer to determine whether a
particular coupling is, in fact... a CISPI coupling.... Clamp-All would suffer
injury only as a result of the defendant's joint efforts having lowered information
costs or created a better product.
Clamp-All Corp., 851 F.2d at 487.
58. See Gates, supra note 29, at 598.
59. See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284,296 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. See Gerla, supranote 15, at 520; see also DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. ofAm. Pathologists,
170 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) ("it is not intrinsically an antitrust violation for an organization to
limit its endorsement to those who meet its published standards unless the standard itself is shown
to be anticompetitive").
61. See Gerla, supra note 15, at 520-21, 525.
62. See id. at 521.
63. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1899.
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other operating systems. Rather, Windows achieved a dominant place in
the market and the substantial network effects in the computer industry
made Windows the standard. 6
Standards are also set by government bodies.65 Standards in highdefinition television and the Internet are recent examples.66 Increasingly,
all levels of government look to the private sector to create standards.67
G. Antitrust Treatment of Standard-SettingOrganizations
Section One of the Sherman Act makes illegal "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce. '68 As interpreted by the courts, this language
prohibits concerted action by two or more firms that unreasonably restrains
trade. 69 Some practices, like price-fixing by competitors, are so obviously
anti-competitive as to be per se illegal, so the actual effect on competition
need not be shown to condemn the practice.7" Other practices are more
complicated and are not found illegal until a thorough analysis of the effect
on competition in the particular market shows the practice to be an
unreasonable restraint.71 This is known as "rule of reason" analysis.72
Standard-setting activities have generally been subject to rule of reason
analysis.73 A standard-setting organization (SSO) does not necessarily

64. Id.Of course, "purely through the operation of the market" is a bit na'fve. Microsoft
engaged in anti-competitive practices to maintain its operating system dominance, which shows that
de facto standards are not necessarily or universally correlative with consumer choice. See
generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (1996) ("[e]xcept [as otherwise provided], all Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies");
see also Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003, Hearing on HR 1086
before the Task Force on Antitrust of the House Committee of the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14-15
(Apr. 9, 2003) (comments of Earl Everett, Director of Safety Engineering, Georgia Department of
Labor) ("Codes of... standard-developing organizations are generally accepted as proper and
effective guidelines in determining safety and quality of various products.").
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
69. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2.2. (2006).
70. See id.§ 2.9.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Livenzey v. Am. Contract Bridge League, No. 82-3325, 1985 WL 2648, at *9 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 1985) ("Although the ACBL acts as an extra-judicial body, its practice does not
facially appear to be one that would always tend to restrict competition."); see also Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,497-98 (1988) (judge correctly instructed thejury
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violate the antitrust laws simply by refusing to certify a product as
compliant with the standard.74 Rather, a plaintiff must show either that the
SSO or its members discriminated against the plaintiff in refusing to
certify the product, or that the conduct as a whole "was manifestly anti[]competitive and unreasonable."75 It has not been enough to show only that
the standard is disputable or has some effect on markets.76
The procedures used to set standards have been an important factor in
the rule of reason analysis of standards setting. While "the absence of
procedural safeguards in the process of making business decisions 'can in
no sense determine the antitrust analysis,"' 77 many courts have required
plaintiffs to show that the standard-setting process was improperly
manipulated 78 and have been reluctant to consider the technical merits of
a standards decision.79 While procedural irregularities in establishing a
standard are relevant to antitrust treatment of SSOs, "the antitrust laws are
not intended as a device to review the details of parliamentary
procedure." 8 °
An SSO's status as a nonprofit does not exempt it from antitrust
scrutiny.8 If an SSO has the capacity to engage in anti-competitive
behavior (such as by expelling members), it can be subject to antitrust
liability. 2 Private SSOs can be held liable for antitrust violations by their

to use rule of reason in standard-setting case); In re Circuit Breaker Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1267, 1277
(C.D. Cal. 1997) ("A standard-setting organization does not per se violate antitrust laws by refusing
to certify a product.") (citations omitted).
74. In re Circuit BreakerLitig., 984 F. Supp. at 1277. See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 292 (5th Cir. 1988) ("We hold that a trade association that evaluates
products and issues opinions, without constraining others to follow its recommendations, does not
per se violate section 1 when, for whatever reason, it fails to evaluate a product favorably to the
manufacturer.").
75. ECOS Elec. Corp. v. Underwriters Labs, Inc., 743 F.2d 498,501 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1980).
76. See DM Research, Inc. v. Coil. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
77. Consol. Metal Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d at 293 (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985)).
78. See, e.g., Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038,
1048 (D. Ariz. 2003); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 488 (1st Cir.
1988).
79. See, e.g., Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1060; Consol. Metal
Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d at 297 ("An individual business decision that is negligent or based on
insufficient facts or illogical conclusions is not a sound basis for antitrust liability.").
80. Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
81. See Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982).
82. See Livenzey v. Am. Contract Bridge League, No. 82-3325, 1985 WL 2648, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 1985).
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agents under an apparent authority theory. 3 It is into this background that
Congress stepped with the SDOAA.
Ill. STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT
ACT OF 2004

The SDOAA 84 extended favorable antitrust treatment to "standards
development organizations" (SDOs)" In Congress's view, technical
standards are critical to the promotion of innovation and competition, 86 yet
SSOs remained potentially liable for treble damages under the antitrust
laws.8 7 This potential liability was said to be exacerbated unfairly by the
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,88 which
requires federal agencies to use, to the extent practicable, privately
developed standards in place of government-specific standards, and
resulted in wider-spread use of private standards.89
An SDO is defined under the SDOAA as "a domestic or international
organization that plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates voluntary
consensus standards using procedures that incorporate the attributes of
openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and
consensus[,] in a manner consistent with the Office of Management and
Budget Circular Number A-119. ' '90 The term does not include the parties
participating in the SDO, such as the competing firms that are members of
the SDO. 9'

83. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 558-59.
84. Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (2004)).
85. From this point forward, this Article will use the term "SSO" to refer to standard-setting
organizations in general and "SDO" to refer to those SSOs that qualify for the protections of the
SDOAA.
86. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-125, at 3-4 (2003), reprintedin 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 609,610-12.
87. See id. at 4-7 (citing Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 556; Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); and litigation against ASTM that settled but produced a "chilling
effect").
88. Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1996)).
89. See § 102, 118 Stat. 661, 661-62 (2004) (findings).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2004)). A-119 directs federal agencies to use "voluntary
consensus standards" in lieu of government-created ones. See A- 119, supra note 51. A- 119's
definition of "voluntary consensus standard" is nearly identical to that of the SDOAA, and A-119
thus offers little additional guidance. See id. As will be discussed below, however, other policies
and guidelines found in A- 119 support a conclusion that adequate consumer representation in an
SDO should be a requirement for an SDO to fall under the SDOAA's protections.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8).
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The SDOAA's other key definition is "standards development
activity," which is defined as "any action taken by [an SDO] for the
purpose of developing, promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing,
interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or
trn
using such standard in conformity assessment activities. ,192 The term
excludes exchange of "cost, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or
distribution" information not reasonably required to develop, promulgate,
or assess conformity of a standard; market allocation; and conspiracies that
would fix prices.93
Under the SDOAA, key substantive components apply to "standards
development organizations engaged in a standards-development activity."
SDOs are subject to rule of reason treatment,94 liability limited to actual
damages, 95 96and recovery of costs and attorney's fees if substantially
prevailing.
In addition to satisfying the "standards development organization" and
"standards development activities" definitions, to qualify for the recovery
limitation, an SDO must file a written disclosure with the Attorney
General and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that includes its name,
principal place of business, and the nature and scope of the standards
development activities in which it engages. 97 The disclosure must be filed
within ninety days of commencement of the standards development
activity. 98 The name, principal place of business, and general terms of the
standards development activity are published by the Attorney General or
FTC in the Federal Register within thirty days of their filing. 99 The

92. Id.(a)(7). Curiously, the SDOAA defines the term "technical standard" by reference to
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act. Id.(a)(9), but the term is never actually
used in the provisions of the SDOAA. An interesting question is whether the SDOAA would cover
trade association rules like the refusal to share patient X-rays in IndianaFederationofDentists. See
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). This Article assumes that such activities would
not constitute standards development activities under the SDOAA because the legislative purpose
and history seem focused purely on standards that are technical in nature, as amorphous as that
concept may be. As Indiana Federationof Dentists makes clear, however, trade association rules
that deprive customers of the products they desire can be extremely anti-competitive, and the case
for consumer representation in trade associations, if those associations are in fact covered by the
SDOAA, is strong. See id. at 455.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(c)(1)-(3) (2004).
94. See id § 4302.
95. See id.§ 4303.
96. Id. § 4304.
97. Id. § 4305(a)(2), (c).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a)(2).
99. Id.(b).
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recovery limitation provision begins to apply thirty days from the SDO's
filing.' 00
Since the passage of the SDOAA, nearly 300 registrations have been
published in the FederalRegister. 0' A sample of the registrations shows
a diverse range of organizations and activities, including a variety of
business standards developed by ASTM International, 10 2 Interactive
Advertising Bureau, 0 3 and Industrial Truck Standards Development
Foundation, Inc."°
IV. CONSUMER CHOICE THEORY & COLLABORATIVE
STANDARD SETTING

This Article asserts that Congress, in passing the SDOAA,
demonstrated a concern that consumer groups be included in the standardsetting process if an SSO is to receive the protections of the Act. This
section therefore discusses the consumer choice view of antitrust with
which the SDOAA neatly fits.
A. Consumer Choice Theory Basics
Neil W. Averitt of the FTC and Professor Robert H. Lande have written
extensively on consumer choice and antitrust.'0 5 In their view, consumer
06
choice, not economic efficiency, is antitrust's central concern.1

100. Id.(c).
101. Using the search terms "15 U.S.C. 4301" and "standards development" and limiting
results to those after July 31, 2004, produced 297 results on March 11, 2007. Some of these
publications supplement earlier initial registration to cover additional activities.
102. 71 Fed. Reg. 18769 (Apr. 12, 2006).
103. Advertising guidelines that intended "to organize the industry to set standards and
guidelines that make Interactive an easier medium for agencies and marketers to buy and capture
value from advertising." 69 Fed. Reg. 61868-01 (Oct. 21, 2004).
104. Activities used to "develop, adopt, amend, publish and distribute voluntary national
consensus standards for industrial trucks, including forklift trucks, and related components,
attachments and equipment." 70 Fed. Reg. 76079-02 (Dec. 22, 2005).
105. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande & Neil W. Averritt, Using the Consumer Choice Paradigm:
A PracticalGuide (forthcoming 2007); Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal
of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001) [hereinafter Consumer Choice]; Robert H. Lande,
Provingthe Obvious: The Antitrust Laws were Passedto Protect Consumers (NotJust to Increase
Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (1999); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory ofAntitrust
and Consumer ProtectionLaw, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
106. See Consumer Choice, supranote 105, at 503.
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Therefore, conduct that "limits the natural range of choices in the
marketplace" should be condemned." °7 By focusing on consumer choice,
antitrust will best be able to produce efficient markets, improve prices and
quality, and "recognize and protect the important elements of innovation,
variety, quality, safety and other aspects of non-price competition."' 8 This
latter group of concerns, especially innovation, quality, and safety, are
particularly relevant here because they are several of the SDOAA's
goals.109
While the consumer choice theory is largely normative, Lande and
Averitt have convincingly argued that a great number of antitrust decisions
can be explained in terms of consumer choice protection." 0 For example,
much of the U.S. government's suit against Microsoft centered on the
foreclosing effect that Microsoft's conduct had on the range of options for
consumers. "' In addition, while enforcement agencies have not focused on
consumer choice, both the federal and state merger guidelines reference
the potential effects of a merger on non-price competition." 12 The SDOAA
should be listed among this recent growth of consumer choice theory.
B. What Consumer Choice Theory Meansfor Standards
In a very basic sense, SSOs are the antithesis of consumer choice:
competition among products allows consumers to determine the future of
a market; collaborative standard setting has the potential to eliminate the
consumer entirely from the equation. This premise can be overstated,
however, so some limiting guidelines are necessary.
Only in certain circumstances might standards actually eliminate or
excessively limit consumer choice. Where an SSO's members lack
sufficient market power and an SSO selects a standard different from what
consumers would chose in a competitive market, competing firms will
presumably stand ready and willing to take advantage of the SSO's
mistaken perception of or deliberate disregard for consumer preferences.
Thus, consumers remain essentially represented in the standard-setting
process by nonmember firms.
Further, while standards that are routinely adopted by governments and
given the force of law have seemingly immense anti-competitive potential,
since producing nonconforming competing products becomes illegal, local
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 503-04.
See id. at 504-05.
Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 102, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305).
See Consumer Choice, supra note 105, at 508-09.
Seeid. at511-12
Seeid.at515-16.
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governments remain politically accountable and thus unable to ignore
consumer preferences when deciding whether to adopt a given standard.
Many local governments may lack the ability to analyze consumer
preferences regarding a given code or adjust those standards to
accommodate particularized consumer preferences. Indeed, the ability to
develop better standards at a lower cost is what makes private standard
setting so attractive. 13 Nonetheless, interested consumer groups, both on
a local and national level, may voice their concerns about the cost and loss
of preferred features resulting from a standard before local governments
decide whether to adopt it.
Similarly, informational, quality, and safety standards that lack the
power of law do not prevent competitors from offering consumers noncertified products that are cheaper (allowing consumers to trade off quality
or safety for price) or accompanied by information explaining why the
product is nonetheless superior.
If included in the standard-setting process, what might consumers add?
Clearly the desires of consumers and of producers will not always align,
particularly where the SSO members have sufficient market power to
ignore consumer preferences. While the specifics of consumer desires will
of course vary with the particular product being standardized (i.e., the
array of particular features that consumers find preferable), two general
observations can be made.
First, in the context of interchangeability standards, timing is
important. As discussed above, an interchangeability standard freezes
innovation in the primary product market but creates increased price and
complementary product competition. Consumers, therefore, have a real
interest in ensuring that SSOs set an interchangeability standard at the
optimal time. That is, if consumers are sufficiently satisfied with the
current state of technology in the primary product, they are more likely to
support an interchangeability standard than if the range of features in the
primary product is still inadequate. Because innovation is costly and risky,
however, primary product firms have an interest in eliminating the costly
innovation competition as soon as possible, and when they have actual
market power, the ability to do so.
Second, in the context of quality and safety standards, consumers will
often choose to trade off quality or safety for price. For this reason,
binding quality and safety standards are generally considered more anticompetitive than standards that simply convey safety and quality

113. See Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 102, 118 Stat. 661 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305).
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information to the consumer without restricting choices." 4 Where an
industry creates a binding quality or safety standard, however, perhaps
even for pro-competitive reasons like economies of scale, the industry and
consumers may diverge on where the quality/safety and price balance
point should be struck. Certainly firms will prefer the point at which profit
margins are highest, but that is not necessarily so for consumers.
V. CONSUMER REPRESENTATION AND THE

SDOAA

One of the attributes of a "voluntary consensus standard" under the
SDOAA is consensus, including "a process for attempting to resolve
objections by interested parties. .
".".
" The SDOAA does not define the
term "interested party," but both the SDOAA's legislative history and the
Office of Management and Budget Circular referenced in the SDOAA as
the basis for definition of "standards development organization" support
the conclusion that Congress intended consumers to be included as
interested parties.
A. References to Consumers in the SDOAA 's LegislativeHistory
The SDOAA's legislative history references consumer representation.
David L. Karmol, Vice President of Public Policy and Government Affairs
for the American Nation Standards Institute (ANSI), spoke at length in the
SDOAA hearings. ANSI has administered and coordinated private-sector
standard setting for nearly 100 years.' 16 ANSI's role is to accredit
standard-setting bodies by determining whether an SSO incorporates
"principles of openness and due process... and [ensures] that a consensus
of all interested parties has been reached.""' 7 ANSI has approved
approximately 11,000 standards, and represents the United States in
international standards organizations.' 8 Thus, Mr. Karmol's testimony is
of considerable guidance in interpreting the SDOAA. His statements

114. See supra text accompanying note 48.
115. A-119,supra note 51.
116. See Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003, Hearing on H.R.
1089 before the Task Force on Antitrust of the House Committee of the Judiciary (Apr. 9, 2003)
(comments of David L. Karmol, Vice President of Public Policy and Government Affairs,
American National Standards Institute) [hereinafter Karmol Comments]. See also American
National Standards Institute, An Historical Overview, at http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/
introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited May 21, 2007).
117. See Karmol Comments, supra note 116.
118. Id.

THE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2004

contain numerous references to consumer representation in the standardsetting process.
In determining whether to accredit an SSO, ANSI requires that SSOs
reach "consensus among all affected stakeholder groups that may include
industry, government, organizations, consumers/labor interests, and other
experts."' 9 ANSI itself is a "unique partnership of industry; professional,
technical, trade, labor, academic and consumer organizations; and some
30 government agencies."' 2 ° In describing the various SSOs accredited by
ANSI, Mr. Karmol noted that those SSOs included the voluntary
participation of consumer groups.' 2 ' ANSI requires that proposed
standards be circulated "both to the consensus body and the public at
large...."'2 2 To be considered an ANSI-compliant standard, there must be
sufficient evidence of"a substantive reasonable basis for its existence and
that it meets the needs of producers, users and other interest groups.' 23
Finally, Mr. Karmol stated that "ANSI has a strong tradition of working
cooperatively with government
as well as industry, organizations, and
124
consumer interests.',

Given the influence of ANSI and the detailed descriptions given by Mr.
Karmol, it appears that Congress's vision of SDOs under the SDOAA was
something along the lines of ANSI-approved SSOs. Because Mr. Karmol's
comments indicated that consumer representation was critical for ANSI
approval, consumer representation as a factor in determining whether an
SSO is indeed an SDO is consistent with the SDOAA's legislative history.
B. 0MB Circular
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-1 19,
referenced in the SDOAA as guidance for interpreting the meaning of due
process for the purpose of determining who is an SDO, supports the view
that the presence or absence of consumer representation in an SSO is an
important factor in determining whether an S SO qualifies as an SDO under
the SDOAA. 2 5 OMB Circular A-119 directs federal agencies to "use

119. See id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Karmol Comments, supra note 116.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. See A- 119, supra note 51. "OMB's predominant mission is to assist the President in
overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive
Branch agencies." OMB's Mission, Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/organization/role.html (last visited May 21, 2007).
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voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards...
except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.' 26 The
Circular sets forth four goals: reduction of government costs, provision of
incentives to establish standards that serve "national needs," economic
growth, and increased "reliance upon the private sector to supply
Government needs for goods and services."' 27
The Circular also guides federal agencies in their participation in the
private standard-setting process in an effort to "increase the likelihood that
[standards] . . . will meet both public and private sector needs.' 28
Agencies "must participate with [private standard-setting bodies] in the
development of voluntary consensus standards when consultation and
with their missions,
participation is in the public interest and is compatible
129
authorities, priorities, and budget resources.'
Agency participation in the private standard-setting process therefore
places agencies in two representative roles. Agencies must represent the
public interest, but also are themselves consumers of the goods and
services being standardized. Thus, under the guidance of the Circular,
federal agencies serve as consumer representatives in SSOs, both directly
as the purchasers of goods and services, and indirectly as guardians of
"national needs." Because the SDOAA references the Circular as
definitional in determining what an SDO is, and because the Circular
envisions consumer representation, such representation appears to have
been within Congress's intent in enacting the SDOAA.
VI. INTERPRETING THE SDOAA IN LIGHT OF CONSUMER CHOICE
A. Threshold Determinationto Fall Under SDOAA in PrivateLitigation
The SDOAA's protections apply to SDOs engaged in standard-setting
activities. Further, the SDOAA has defined "SDO" fairly specifically to
include representation of interested parties, consensus, and due process.
While there have been no cases analyzing whether a particular SSO is
covered by the SDOAA, it would seem that to give effect to Congress's
goal of encouraging voluntary consensus standard setting, antitrust
plaintiffs suing SSOs have an opportunity to challenge as an initial matter
whether an SSO has in fact provided the procedural protections and
126.
127.
128.
129.

A-119, supra note 51.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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included the necessary parties required by the SDOAA. Because neither
the Department of Justice (DOJ) nor the FTC certify an SSO as an SDO,
there is in practice no other opportunity to challenge whether an SSO
satisfies the definition provided in the SDOAA.
There is, of course, a strong incentive for SSOs that do not comply with
the SDOAA's definitional standard to avoid the SDOAA altogether. SSOs
that disclose their identities and activities to the DOJ and FTC have put
themselves on the radar screens of those agencies, and thus risk
enforcement action. Thus, FTC and DOJ enforcement policy should play
a primary role in fulfilling the objectives of the SDOAA.
B. DOJ/FTCEnforcement FollowingDisclosure
Both the DOJ and the FTC have issued press releases pertaining to the
SDOAA."3 ° Neither release mentions any agency role beyond receiving
registrations, verifying that the required information is present in the
paperwork, and arranging for publication in the Federal Register. The
DOJ's Antitrust Division Manual does make clear, however, that upon
receipt of a notification under the SDOAA, the Division will first
"determine whether the notification discloses information of antitrust
concern that merits the opening of a preliminary inquiry."13 '
While there is not a DOJ policy on the SDOAA specifically, the
Antitrust Division has addressed a pre-SDOAA SSO's activities in a
business review letter issued pursuant to the Department of Justice's
Business Review Procedure.132 The review letter was sought by the
American Welding Society (Society) in regard to its development of a
robotic welding cell interface standard.'33 The Society was accredited
ANSI.13 4 While the Division stated that it lacked the information needed

130. See generallyPress Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Notice on Implementation
of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (June 24, 2004), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/sdoaa.htm (last visited May 21, 2007); Press Release,
Department of Justice, Justice Department Implements the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act of 2004 (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa
pr/2004/June/04 at 443.htm (last visited May 21, 2007).
131.

ANTITRUST DivisioN MANUAL, NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION

ACTOF 1993 (3d ed.), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanua/204293.htm (last
visited May 21, 2007). The Manual refers to the NCRPA (which was amended by the SDOAA),
but also to SDOs, so it appears that this policy applies to SDOs under the SDOAA. See id.
132. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2007).
133. See Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, to Douglas W. Macdonald, Esq., Wester, Chamberlain & Bean (Oct. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter James's Letter (on file with Department of Justice).
134. Id.
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to conduct a rule of reason analysis on the Society's standard-setting
activities, its position was that it had "no present inclination to challenge
the Society's adoption of the standard endorsed by its Committee."' 35
The Division also made several statements that might provide guidance
as to how the Division will pursue enforcement against SDOs. First, the
Division made clear that it would not consider whether "we think one
standard is better or worse than another."' 36 Rather, the Division would
look to whether the process for setting the standard had been abused and
whether there was any anti-competitive conduct by the Society or its
members.'37 Second, and important in the context of this Article, the
Division noted that the Society was comprised of both producers and
consumers of the product, and "there is little reason to believe that the
latter would knowingly deprive themselves of reasonable competitive
options. '
While the DOJ has given some indication that consumer representation
in the standard-setting process is relevant in determining whether a
standard is anti-competitive, in light of the SDOAA's shift away from
private enforcement and toward agency enforcement against SSOs,
additional guidelines pertaining specifically to the SDOAA should be
developed.
Finally, SDOAA disclosures to the DOJ and FTC should provide a
treasure trove of data that the agencies (and academics) can use to analyze
trends in standards setting. For example, it would be helpful to know what
percentage of SDOs are approved by ANSI or other experienced
certification organizations, what industries are taking advantage of the Act,
and what types of activities are involved. By cross-referencing this data
against what we know about the types of industries and firms prone to or
with a history of cartelization, agency enforcement efforts can be better
focused.
C. Determining Whether Consumers Are Represented
Determining whether there is adequate consumer representation in an
SSO to fulfill the goals of the SDOAA requires the courts and enforcement
agencies to consider both the type of standard being developed and the
make-up and status of the SSO. As discussed above, not all standards will
result in the elimination of future consumer choice. Informational

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
James's Letter, supra note 133.

THE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZ4TIONADVANCEMENT

ACT OF2004

standards such as seals of approval leave consumers free to purchase
noncompliant products and noncompliant firms free to persuade
consumers that their products are nonetheless desirable or even superior.
The absence of consumer representation in the informational standardsetting process does not affect consumer choice and is not anticompetitive.'39 Safety standards that are adopted by governments and
given the force of law, while resulting in the complete elimination of
noncompliant products from the market, do not require consumer
representation because consumers are free to persuade lawmakers not to
adopt a standard because it removes desirable products from the market.
Where quality or safety standards are not adopted into law, and where
they are not merely informational but rather include an agreement among
SSO members not to produce noncompliant products, consumer
representation is critical if the SSO members have market power. When
this is the case, an SSO that does not include consumer groups or consider
their objections as part of the consensus process has effectively dictated to
the market what products will be available regardless of consumer
preferences.140 Such SSOs are anti-competitive and conflict with the goals
of the SDOAA. Similarly, variety-simplification standards that include an
agreement not to produce noncompliant products effectively eliminate
choices from the market if the SSO members have market power.
Interchangeability standards should also require consumer
representation. Because of the role that network effects play, a successful
interchangeability standard effectively eliminates noncompliant products
from the market or at least makes competition exceedingly difficult and
discourages market entry. Further, the critical mass necessary to tip an
interchangeability standard into a dominant position is less than full
market power because network effects are snowball effects.' 41 It is
therefore critical that consumers be represented in the process of setting
interchangeability standards. This ensures that the optimal mix of features
are included and that the standard is not set too early in the life cycle of the
industry, which would result in a prematurely installed base and stifle
innovation.

139. To the extent informational standards can be used to mislead, consumer fraud laws
provide redress and deterrence.
140. If the SSO members lack market power, competing firms can continue to offer
noncompliant products, and consumers are essentially "represented" by nonmember firms.
141. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright
Misuse, andAntitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 173-74 (1999) ("When network effects
are present.., the market has a tendency to 'tip' in the direction of whatever firm gains an initial
edge.").
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Where it is essential that consumers be represented, the courts and
enforcement agencies must also consider who represents consumers. In
some instances this should be easy to determine. For example, where a
standard is set for a machine used in producing an automobile part, the
consumers are firms themselves. Including all consuming firms or a
representative sample should ensure adequate consumer representation.
Further, simply providing notice to those consumers should be adequate,
as they will have both the incentive and means to participate should they
so choose.
Representation for standards set for retail products is more complex.
Private nonprofit consumer groups, such as Consumers Union, are
potential representatives.142 State or federal agencies or attorneys general
can also represent the consumers who are their constituents and to whom
they are beholden. Further, marketing information can serve as a proxy for,
or additional measure of, consumer representation. If an SSO has gathered
marketing information that describes consumer preferences and develops
a standard with those preferences in mind, an SSO has not forced a less
desirable product onto consumers. If the SSO has not gathered such
information, has used survey techniques to manipulate a pre-desired result,
or has acted contrary to the information, courts and enforcement agencies
should examine the SSO more closely.
Finally, courts and enforcement agencies should consider whether the
SSO has been certified by a credible certification organization such as
ANSI. ANSI has considerable experience certifying SSOs and was
influential in the passage of the SDOAA, so ANSI compliance should
generally satisfy courts and enforcement agencies that an SSO has
adequately represented consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION

Predicting an optimal outcome for consumers is a difficult task.
Congress, courts, enforcement agencies, and private litigants attempt to do
so, but the aftermath of any given antitrust rule or decision is often
uncertain. This difficulty and uncertainty is particularly acute in the
context of standard setting, since innovation and economic development
depend on when, how, and what standards are set.
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of a consumer choice approach to
antitrust analysis of standards is that it puts a greater amount of control

142. See ConsumersUnion.org Web Site, http://www.consumersunion.org/ (last visited May
21, 2007).
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over consumer well-being in the hands of consumers. Because standards
are a complex and technical business, the debate over standards is often
scientific or economic. A very basic premise can be easily overlooked in
this debate: a free market economy flourishes because it is driven by
consumer demand. Congress has taken an important step toward ensuring
that standards are aligned with consumer preferences, and courts and
enforcement agencies should take this guidance seriously as our reliance
on standards continues to grow.
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